A Moment of Truth for European Digital Sovereignty

Among the many challenges that the European Union is currently facing, one of significant importance is strengthening Europe’s role within the digital ecosystem. Its ability to establish itself as a global geopolitical actor in this domain will have decisive implications for the continent’s economic potential and security, in all its various dimensions.

The ‘Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty’

This premise should already provide a meaningful indication of the potential importance of the ‘Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty.’ Adopted by representatives of the EU Member States at the Berlin summit on 18 November, this text has no binding legal force. However, it can reasonably be assumed that it will inspire EU and national policies in the coming years.

One aspect of the Declaration that deserves special attention is its definition of digital sovereignty: “the EU and its Member States’ ability to act autonomously and to freely choose their own solutions, while reaping the benefits of collaboration with global partners, when possible.” If words are to be taken seriously, such a definition has very little to do with the traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’ — it rather evokes the notion of ‘autonomy,’ which is linked to a freedom (rather than a power) of choice.

More concretely, the Declaration provides a subsequent definition of digital sovereignty as the ability “to act independently in the digital world, allowing for autonomous decisions about the use, governance, and development of digital systems without undue reliance on external actors in order to protect our European democracies and our European values.” Again, the resulting notion of sovereignty is highly unusual: it aims at protecting the core elements of European legal and institutional systems without relying excessively on external actors. In other words, what is avoided is not reliance on external interventions as such in order to safeguard one’s way of being, but rather an excessive degree of dependence. If one truly wishes to speak of sovereignty, the concept that most readily comes to mind is that of “states with limited sovereignty” which was developed in 1968 by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev for the countries of the Soviet Bloc in Central and Eastern Europe.

Against this backdrop, the reflections prompted by the ‘Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty’ are particularly troubling because they reveal Europe’s readiness to acknowledge its own weakness — doing so, moreover, in a text that, by virtue of its title alone, should represent an assertion of strength, or at the very least a declaration of intent to become stronger.

However, the real issue lies elsewhere. Even after acknowledging that Europe has no real ambition to be ‘sovereign’ within the digital ecosystem, the question remains as to whether it makes sense to continue speaking of ‘digital sovereignty’ in the European context. It is true that relinquishing one’s prerogatives is a symptom of weakness that can be deeply harmful. But it is equally true that a kitten that believes itself to be a tiger may encounter undesirable situations: if you define yourself as a ‘tiger,’ you should at least be able to appear as one.

This is where major problems arise. Around the time the ‘Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty’ was adopted, certain developments raised serious doubts about the kind of ‘feline’ we are dealing with. Two facts stand out in this respect.

The EU Digital Omnibus Package

The first fact is related to the EU Digital Omnibus Package, presented by the European Commission on 19 November. This set of measures amends European rules governing the digital ecosystem—especially in the areas of artificial intelligence and data protection—in order to simplify compliance, reduce burdens, and postpone the entry into force of some of the most stringent provisions. Many arguments can undoubtedly be advanced in favor of revising existing European regulations. Nevertheless, this package can hardly hide the impression that it represents a step backward from the EU’s broader strategic orientation. For quite a long time (at least during the last decade), the Union has positioned itself as the global geopolitical actor most committed to ensuring that new technologies develop within a well-defined regulatory framework. Notwithstanding all the considerations based on realism, it is clear that the measures recently proposed by the Commission pursue a different objective: rather than ensuring that economic actors comply with obligations designed to protect users’ rights, the primary aim now seems to be preventing such actors from leaving Europe and settle in other areas of the world characterized by fewer regulatory constraints.

The Fine Imposed On X (And the Visa Ban on Thierry Breton)

The second fact is open to different interpretations, at least for now. On 5 December, the European Commission imposed a €120 million fine on X for breaching its transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act. At first glance, this sanction signals the EU’s intention to enforce the rules applicable within its territory, including against foreign operators. By fining X — and thus challenging Elon Musk — the Commission has clearly decided to confront one of the major global geopolitical actors, and the only possible motive can be to assert its ‘sovereign’ prerogatives. Musk’s vehement reaction to the fine makes it clear how high the stakes have become, and the support that these criticisms have received from figures within the US government intensifies the confrontation further.

The emerging conflict, which was exacerbated by Musk claiming that the European Union should cease to exist, culminated in the US government’s visa ban on Thierry Breton, the former European Commissioner, who was “found guilty” of drafting European regulations on new technologies (including the Digital Services Act).

The reaction of the European Union is a potentially crucial test case. If the EU confirms the sanction and proves capable of enforcing it, it will send a clear signal of strength. If, by contrast, the fine is allowed to fade into oblivion, this will be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

A Tiger or a Kitten?

The alternative is particularly sensitive because it pits the European Union against the United States, two entities that are increasingly out of sync on the global geopolitical stage. There are currently numerous sources of tension between the two, one of the most evident being their differing approaches to the regulation of new technologies — or, to put it differently, the degree of freedom to be granted to major technology companies. The conditions are therefore in place for the fine imposed on X to represent either Europe’s first concrete step towards confronting the United States in ICT policy, or a bleak move towards dependence, along a path marked by impotence.

One might even say that the moment of truth has finally come. It is indeed time to determine whether Europe is capable of being a ‘digital tiger’, ready to defend its own (cyber)space, or whether it is destined to remain a domestic kitten, at most allowed—from time to time—to briefly hike beyond the edge of its own garden.